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Abstract— Organizations rely on security experts to improve 
the security of their systems. These professionals use background 
knowledge and experience to align known threats and 
vulnerabilities before selecting mitigation options. The substantial 
depth of expertise in any one area (e.g., databases, networks, 
operating systems) precludes the possibility that an expert would 
have complete knowledge about all threats and vulnerabilities. To 
begin addressing this problem of fragmented knowledge, we 
investigate the challenge of developing a security requirements 
rule base that mimics multi-human expert reasoning to enable new 
decision-support systems.  In this paper, we show how to collect 
relevant information from cyber security experts to enable the 
generation of: (1) interval type-2 fuzzy sets that capture intra- and 
inter-expert uncertainty around vulnerability levels; and (2) fuzzy 
logic rules driving the decision-making process within the 
requirements analysis. The proposed method relies on 
comparative ratings of security requirements in the context of 
concrete vignettes, providing a novel, interdisciplinary approach 
to knowledge generation for fuzzy logic systems. The paper 
presents an initial evaluation of the proposed approach through 
52 scenarios with 13 experts to compare their assessments to those 
of the fuzzy logic decision support system. The results show that 
the system provides reliable assessments to the security analysts, 
in particular, generating more conservative assessments in 19% of 
the test scenarios compared to the experts’ ratings.  
Index Terms —user study; vignettes; scenarios; recommender 
system; security requirements; fuzzy logic; type-2; uncertainty. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The rate of security attacks on different organizations has 
been increasing over recent years. According to the Global State 
of Information Security survey, security incidents increased in 
2015 by 38% above reports from 2014, which led to a 56% 
increase in intellectual property theft [22]. The survey also 
reports that 53% of organizations are conducting employee 
training and awareness programs, and 54% designate a Chief 
Security Officer (CSO) to lead teams of security specialists [22]. 
The focus on establishing professional personnel to address this 
problem illustrates the reliance on human experts to 
comprehensively assess the security of systems. However, 
despite the abundance of security requirements, checklists, 
guidelines and best practices, such as the U.S. NIST Special 
Publication 800 Series, human analysts still face substantial 
challenges in the selection of the appropriate security 
requirements to mitigate threats. For example, depending on the 
chosen attack scenario, analysts must still evaluate a range of 
possible security authentication requirements, such as password 
complexity, single and multifactor authentication.   
In addition to the composition of requirements, the number 
of security experts in the world is scarce. According to the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor statistics, there are 82,900 information security 
analysts in the U.S. in 2014, earning a median of $89,000 a year 
[29]. In 2014, Cisco’s Annual Security report warned that the 
shortage in security professionals by the end of 2014 is reaching 
one million [4]. In addition, more than 209,000 cybersecurity 
jobs in the U.S are unfilled and 53% growth in demand is 
expected by 2018 [27]. The scarcity of experts and the need for 
cyber security, makes the provision of intelligent decision 
support and semi-automated solutions a necessity. 
The contribution of this paper is a novel empirical method 
for constructing an Interval Type-2 Fuzzy Logic System 
(IT2FLS) for automated cyber security assessments. The 
method extends a scalable technique for acquiring adequacy 
ratings of security requirements by measuring the extent to 
which these requirements interact to affect security, while 
accounting for uncertainty across raters [12]. The use of fuzzy 
sets (FSs) associated with linguistic labels, in combination with 
fuzzy logic rules provides the resulting decision support system 
with a high degree of human (expert) interpretability, which in 
turn is vital for its evaluation and acceptance. The paper 
specifically adopts Type-2 FSs which offer an advantage over 
Type-1 FSs, because they allow the distinct capture of both 
inter- and intra-expert uncertainty [31]. In this paper, we present 
a series of studies to construct and evaluate the IT2FLS in using 
a series of scenarios. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows: in Section II 
we show background on the process of security assessment, 
general aspects of uncertainty and IT2FLSs; in Section III, we 
present our overall approach to the problem; in Section IV, we 
present the rule base extracted from user surveys; in Section V 
we present evaluation results; in Section VI we discuss threats 
to validity; we discuss and conclude in Section VII. 
II. BACKGROUND 
We now provide background to our interdisciplinary 
approach to model security assessments.  
A. Security Assessment 
A security assessment is a decision by a security analyst 
about a system’s readiness to withstand potential cyber-attacks. 
The ISO 27000 Series, U.S. NIST Special Publication (SP) 800 
Series, and the Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
(ITIL) requires analysts to conduct risk assessments to 
determine readiness. Under NIST SP 800-53, the analyst decides 
if a specific system is high, medium or low impact and then the 
analyst satisfies the impact rating by selecting security controls 
(e.g., audit events, lock sessions, etc.) Each control represents a 
class of technology aimed at mitigating a security threat. An 
unaddressed challenge to this approach is that the threats, 
vulnerabilities and security mitigations change over time: new 
technologies introduce new vulnerabilities, and attackers 
become more sophisticated in their attacks to weaken a 
collection of mitigations that work together. Security auditing 
tools, such as the Security Content Automation Protocol 
(SCAP), trace vulnerabilities to mitigations; however, these 
tools rely heavily on vendors to supply vulnerability data, and 
they do not address design risks from custom built software. 
We highlight general challenges to human-based security 
assessments: 
• Context: experts’ risk assessment of a system must consider 
the system context in which the requirements apply [12, 13].  
• Priorities: some requirements have higher priorities than 
others, depending on their strength in mitigating threats [12].   
• Uncertainty: security risk assessment and decision-making 
includes a level of uncertainty [13, 23].  
• Stove-piping: security expertise crosses different domains of 
knowledge such as hardware, software, cryptography, and 
operating systems [13].  
Our aim is not to remove the above challenges through 
increased decision-support. Instead, we account for these 
challenges by modeling human decision making with 
uncertainty, in a security assessment support tool based on 
collected data from various security experts. 
B. Uncertainty in Requirements Engineering    
Uncertainty is increasingly a focal point for researchers in 
requirements and software engineering.  In architecture, Garlan 
argues that the human-in-the-loop, mobility, rapid evolution, 
and cyber physical systems are possible sources of uncertainty 
[9]. Esfahani and Malek identify sources of uncertainty in self-
adaptive systems and they include the human-in-the-loop as a 
source of uncertainty [6]. In requirements engineering, Yang et. 
al [35] used machine learning to capture language uncertainties 
in speculative requirements. The approach succeeds at 
identifying speculative sentences, but performs weaker at 
identifying the scope of uncertainty when identifying specific 
parts of speech such as adjectives, adverbs, and nouns. The 
FLAGS is a goal modelling language introduced to model 
uncertainty in self adaptive systems [1, 21].  
Cailliau and van Lamsweerde introduce a method to encode 
knowledge uncertainties in probabilistic goals [2]. This method 
characterizes uncertainty as the probability of goal satisfaction 
using estimates of likelihood collected from experts. Although 
the authors’ method is sound, the reliability depends heavily on 
a third-party method to record expert estimates [2]. In this paper, 
we contribute a novel method to elicit estimates and incorporate 
estimates into an IT2FLS. 
C. Uncertainty and Type 2 Fuzzy Logic  
Zadeh introduced Fuzzy Logic (FL) in 1965 as a 
mathematical tool in which the calculations use a degree of truth 
rather than simple propositions; true or false [36]. To illustrate, 
security experts have been shown to use the linguistic adjectives 
inadequate, adequate, and excessive on a 5-point semantic scale 
to evaluate the security of the scenarios [12]. Let X be our 
universe of discourse on a continuous, real-valued, inclusive 
scale 𝑋 = [1,5]  and set 𝐴 ∈ 𝑋  to represent “Adequate.” 
Assume that an interval between [2,3]is adequate, as shown in 
Fig. 1(a).  The function 𝜇-(𝑥) is the membership function (MF) 
to describe A, where 1 is true and 0 is false:  𝐴 ⇒ 𝜇- 𝑥 = 	 1								2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 30							𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒          (1)       
  Based on the definition above, a value like 1.9 for example 
is not adequate, because 2 is the inclusive threshold value for 
the adequate set, but 3.1 is very close to adequate or is adequate 
with a lesser degree than 1, but greater than 0.  To address this 
concern, fuzzy set theory allows one to express to what degree 
a value x belongs to a fuzzy set [16, 36].  Figure 1(b) shows how 
a fuzzy set F, captures adequate. 
 
Fig. 1. The definition of adequate in crisp and fuzzy sets 
A fuzzy set F of values in X may be represented as a set of 
ordered pairs of the value x and its membership grade [16],  𝐹 = 	 𝑥, 𝜇> 𝑥 |	𝑥 ∈ 𝑋                       (2) 
Type-1 MFs summarize the results of experts’ ratings into a 
single MF, suppressing the uncertainty in the data. Alternatively, 
Type-2 MFs model the uncertainty by providing a footprint of 
uncertainty (FOU) [16, 19]. Figure 2 below highlights a 
prototypical Type-2 FS, specifically, a so-called Interval Type-
2 (IT2) FS, which is completely defined by an upper and lower 
Type-1 MF which together form the FOU. Note that IT2 FSs are 
a simplification of General Type-2 FSs, where the former assign 
the value of 1 to all secondary memberships (i.e. all points on 
the FOU are weighted equally as 1) and the latter allow variation 
in[0,1]of this weighting [16,17]. This paper only uses IT2 FSs 
throughout. 
 
Fig. 2. Type-2 FOU constructed by blurring a Type-1 MF 
D. Interval Type 2 Fuzzy Logic Systems  
Type-2 FSs are used in rule-based intelligent systems. The 
rule base is expressed as a collection of if-then statements and 
they can be collected by surveying experts in the field [17]. In 
the remainder of this paper we will show how we build a security 
system using an IT2FL approach. Figure 3 shows the main 
components of the proposed system. The components shown in 
Fig. 3 represent what is typically found in IT2FLS [17, 19]. The 
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the addition of a type reducer. The type reducer reduces the 
inference engine’s IT2FS output to an interval Type-1 FS that 
the defuzzifier can use to produce the final crisp output number. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Mamdani IT2FLS for Security Assessment 
III. OVERALL APPROACH  
In this section we explain our overall research method to 
build a security assessment system using IT2FLS. Our 
contribution is two-fold: 
• A comprehensive approach for developing the linguistic 
labels and associated membership functions for an FLS. 
• An innovative approach to designing the rule base from 
surveys of domain experts.  
 Now, we describe these two contributions.  
A. Developing Linguistic Labels and Associated Fuzzy Sets 
For the FSs used in the security assessment system, we had 
to decide on the appropriate linguistic labels, which are the 
vocabulary used in the system. The choice of labels relies on 
background knowledge and expertise in the field, and user 
surveys that support the choices made [16, 19]. We first 
conducted a focus group using 5 researchers in our lab. A group 
of labels to describe overall security levels were discussed in the 
context of a concrete scenario. The labels discussed in the focus 
group include labels used in prior research [16, 19] in fuzzy 
logic. An outcome of this focus group was the recognitions that 
in security domain, requirements serve to mitigate threats and 
decrease risk. With the goal of mitigating threats, security 
requirements can be described as: inadequate, adequate, or 
excessive, because security requirements are often cost 
requirements, meaning the value is not so obvious to achieve 
primary system goals and users often have difficulties seeing the 
benefits. Furthermore, excessive security has negative financial 
and usability effects, while adequate security is what an 
organization might settle for. Hence, we developed three labels 
to describe security adequacy: inadequate, adequate, and 
excessive.  
Next, we will describe how we evaluated these labels 
experimentally, and the English language proficiency test we 
conducted on each participant, so we can reliably use the labels’ 
in our design and evaluation.  
1) Evaluating the Linguistic Labels Experimentally  
It is important to realize here that we are creating a new scale 
to measure our construct of security adequacy, because there are 
no existing, empirically valid scales to measure this construct. 
Psychometric researchers describe this type of scale as an ad hoc 
scale due to the lack of valid or reliable scales [8]. Creating ad 
hoc scales requires evaluation to examine the reliability of the 
scales rather than relying on the face validity alone [8]. In 
contrast to construct validity, the face validity is subjective: if a 
test or measure looks like it will measure what it is supposed to 
measure, then it is said to have face validity [18].   
We bootstrapped our scale terminology by selecting 
standard dictionary synonyms to the three main anchor points, 
inadequate, adequate, and excessive, to yield a 17-word dataset. 
We replaced adequate with average, because we were interested 
to see where excessive and inadequate rank compared to the 
average or mid-point. We surveyed 213 participants on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT) asking them to rank the 17 words. Our 
results show that excessive ranks higher than “average” across 
four scenarios, and inadequate ranks below average in three out 
of four scenarios [11]. 
English proficiency is necessary to yield accurate results as 
a participant need to have the language capabilities to 
distinguish meanings among the list of words that contain 
synonyms. One could limit the AMT participation to people 
located in the U.S., however, location is unreliable, because U.S. 
residency does not guarantee English proficiency, and there are 
ways to fake locations. We tested English language reading 
proficiency using a subset of the Nelson-Denny reading 
comprehension test. We discuss these results in detail, along 
with the word ranking study in a separate technical report [11]. 
In the word-ranking study, participants are only allowed to 
proceed to the ranking survey, if they pass the proficiency test 
in 15 minutes with a score of 80% or above. 
2) Eliciting the Membership Functions for the Fuzzy Sets  
The membership function definition depends upon a scale 
assignment along an interval (e.g., from one to ten) for each 
word selected from our ranking study. We adopted the approach 
commonly accepted by the fuzzy logic research community in 
which experts are asked to assign the interval start and end 
points on one scale for each word [16, 19]. Participants were 
asked to specify the intervals of the 17 words from our previous 
ranking survey plus the word adequate (total 18 words) using the 
text template we show below, replacing Adequate with each of 
the other 17 words. We include a security scenario to add context 
to each word as follows: 
 
A security expert was asked to rate a security 
scenario with regards to mitigating the Man-in-the-
Middle threat.  
The expert would give an overall security rating 
using a linguistic term.  
In the next sections of this survey, we will present 
18 linguistic terms describing the overall security 
of a scenario. We would like you to mark an interval 
between 1-10 that represents each term.  
Note: Intervals for different terms can overlap.  
For each word (e.g., “adequate”), participants were asked:  
Imagine "Adequate" represented by an interval on a 
range from 1-10. Where would you indicate the start 
and end of an "Adequate” security rating? 
We randomized the word order in the survey, and we 
recruited participants by sending out email invitation to security 
mailing lists at Carnegie Mellon University. Similar to our prior 
work [12], we use a test to assess the security knowledge of the 
survey participants. 
We collected intervals from 38 security experts that consists 
of 74% males, 18% females, and 8% unreported. The average 
score on the security knowledge test is 6 out of 10 possible 
points (𝑠𝑑 = 1.75). For each word, we calculated the average 
for the interval end points that we collected from participants. 
The results show that the three words: inadequate, adequate, and 
excessive are sufficient to be used as FSs covering an interval 
from 1-10. Figure 4 shows the selected FSs and their coverage 
of the 1-10 interval. The solid region represents the interval 
between the mean values of the start and end points collected 
from the experts. The shaded region on each side of the solid 
region represents the standard deviation for that point, which 
represents the uncertainty surrounding the mean value. It is only 
possible to cover the entire region from 1-10 because of the 
uncertainty that yield overlapping intervals for the three words. 
Mendel explains how this approach improves performance as it 
reduces the size of the rule base [16]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The fuzzy sets with the start and end means and standard deviation   
After choosing the labels for the fuzzy sets, we now explain 
how to derive the MFs. We create the Type-1 MF and then blur 
its mean by adding a degree of uncertainty and creating the 
shaded region that represents the FOU. We calculate the mean 
for the Gaussian Type-1 MF by averaging the two end points for 
the interval representing each word: 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛FGHIJKLM =	(𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛NHLJH + 	𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛IGP)/2 . Then, we average the standard 
deviation : 𝜎FGHIJKLM = (𝜎NHLJHS + 𝜎IGPS )/2 . 
To represent the uncertainty level surrounding the Gaussian 
Type-1 MF:  let 𝛼	 represent the uncertainty level, and then 
calculate two means: 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 and use these for the upper 
and lower membership calculations: 𝑚1 = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛FGHIJKLM − 	𝛼 , 
and 	𝑚2 = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛FGHIJKLM + 𝛼 . We assume that we have 50% 
uncertainty present in our data, which makes: 𝛼 = 0.5.	Table I 
shows the final means and standard deviations for each word 
label for fuzzy sets. Figure 5 illustrates the membership 
functions. We use the same MFs for all the inputs: network, 
SSL, password, and timer; and for the output.   
B. Discovering the Fuzzy Rules from the Experts 
We need a rule base to build our security assessment system. 
The rule base should closely emulate how a human expert makes 
decisions. While security experts understand the domain and can 
make relevant decisions [13], it is unclear the extent to which 
this knowledge exists in the form of rules, or how easily experts 
recall relevant knowledge to express rules. The canonical 
approach is to develop a set of if-then rules and then ask experts 
to evaluate the rules and their consequences. This approach has 
been followed by fuzzy logic researchers [16, 19].   
We choose a different approach. We believe asking experts 
directly about rules puts security requirements into a checklist, 
which treats the requirements as independent. In prior work [12], 
we found that requirements exist in composition with priorities 
among them. In addition, if we select a rule base based on our 
own judgment and then present the rules to experts to evaluate, 
we would introduce our own knowledge bias. How can we know 
that we selected the rule set that is representative of the problem, 
and how many antecedents exist? Wu and Mendel suggest that 
the number of rules could increase exponentially to the number 
of membership functions for each input [34]. We discuss this 
further when we present our extracted rules in Section IV. 
 
TABLE I.  SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE THREE FUZZY SETS  
Word  𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒍 𝝈𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒍 𝒎𝟏 𝒎𝟐 
Inadequate 2.58 1.26 2.08 3.08 
Adequate 6.75 1.75 6.25 7.25 
Excessive 9.50 1.35 10.00 9.00 
 
 
Fig. 5. The MFs the input/output variable(s)   
C. Designing the Fuzzy Logic Assessment system  
A number of researchers have built software packages and 
tools for IT2FLSs [3, 20, 33, 34]. Packages and tools were 
designed for the mathematics modeling and simulation software 
MATLAB, and are based on the .m files originally written by 
Mendel and Wu. We chose to use the Juzzy and JuzzyOnline 
Java-based toolkit to obtain our results, because these are open-
source and actively maintained by a team of fuzzy logic 
researchers [30, 32]. Based on prior IT2FLSs research [34], we 
made the following design choices:  
1) Input and output MF shapes: The choice of MFs is 
dependent upon the context of the problem and other factors, 
such as continuity, and computational cost. We chose to use a 
Gaussian shape for our MFs for it’s added advantage of 
simplicity and faster computation time [34].  As explained in 
Section III.A.2, we selected three membership functions for 
each input domain: inadequate, adequate, and excessive.  
2) Input Fuzzification: An important step in a fuzzy system 
is to fuzzify the input by mapping an input vector 𝑋 =(𝑥d′, … , 𝑥f′) into 𝑝 fuzzy sets 𝑋F	, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑝  [16, 34]. We 
choose to use the singleton fuzzifier, where: 𝜇hi 𝑥F = 1	at 𝑥F = 𝑥F′ and : 𝜇hi 𝑥F = 0	otherwise. Singleton fuzzifiers are 
more practical due to their simplicity [16, 34]. The input to the 
system would be a number between 1-10 representing the level 
of the security requirements adequacy to mitigate a threat. 
3) Rules: we construct the rules following the Mamdani 
‘style’, thus preserving the use of linguistic labels at the output 
stage – supporting  human-interpretability [16, 34]. We also 
chose the minimum t-norm, because we want our security 
assessment system to act conservatively. 
IV. RULESET DISCOVERED FROM SECURITY EXPERTS  
In this section we explain how we translate the user survey 
results from prior work [12] to a rule base for the assessment 
system.  In the user study, participants rated the overall security 
of scenarios using a 3-point scale: 1=excessive, 0=adequate, and 
-1=inadequate. Participants also rated four individual 
requirements related factors in scenarios: network type, using 
SSL, password strength, and presence of a timer using a five-
point semantic scale with: 5=excessive, 3=adequate, and 
1=inadequate with the midpoints: 2,4 between inadequate-





adequate and adequate-excessive, respectively. Experts rated 
four security scenarios with four network types: employer’s 
network, public Wi-Fi, unencrypted VPN, and encrypted VPN. 
Each scenario included a password, timer, and SSL 
requirements. The password and timer had two conditions each 
(either strong or weak) [16].  
Based on our prior results [16], we built the rules as follows:  
• The regression results for the overall security ratings indicate 
network type has the major significant effect, it takes priority 
over other requirements.  
• The network rating suggests that network type can drop the 
overall ratings significantly with no significant effect for the 
other factors, hence it is safe to remove the other factors from 
the rule antecedents only when the network type drops to 
inadequate.  
• When network type increases to adequate, other 
requirements are included as antecedents, because the 
statistical results show that the model with all the four factors 
exhibits an effect over the null model. 
Next, we show how we applied the above heuristics. 
A. The Inadequate Network  
The public Wi-Fi and the VPN over unencrypted Wi-Fi 
networks significantly dropped the overall security ratings 
towards inadequate (Public Wi-Fi: 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = −0.7 , VPN-
unencrypted 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = −0.4 ). The public Wi-Fi ratings are 
closer to inadequate (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = 1.3 ) while VPN-unencrypted 
ratings are in between adequate and inadequate (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = 2.2) 
[16]. From the above, we can infer that when the network type 
is inadequate, then no other requirement(s) would matter in 
deciding the adequacy of the overall security. Hence, we 
construct the following rule:  
 𝑅d: 𝐼𝐹	𝑵𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝑻𝒚𝒑𝒆	𝑖𝑠	𝑰𝒏𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒆 	𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑁	𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒍𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈	𝑖𝑠	𝑰𝒏𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒆		 
 
Reduction of rules in rulesets used in intelligent systems 
simplifies the reasoning for the human analysts interacting with 
the system [21]. Without the results from our user study [16], we 
would have more rules with more input combinations. For 
example, we would have a four antecedent rule, wherein each 
input antecedent has three MFs: inadequate, adequate, and 
excessive. For the inadequate network alone, input 
combinations of the remaining three inputs (SSL, password and 
timer) will result in 27 rules and, if we follow a canonical 
approach, we would need to survey experts to obtain the 
consequents of all 27 rules. However, our approach derives rules 
from the statistical analysis of the empirical results in which 
factor levels that are not significant are dropped.  
B. The Adequate and Excessive Network Types 
When the network adequacy level increases, then the rules 
for factors would change as well. The remaining network types 
in the study: employer’s network and Encrypted VPN were rated 
close to adequate, but never close to excessive (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = 2.6, 
and 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = 2.9  respectively). The overall security of the 
scenario was rated below adequate: (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = −0.19 , and 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = −0.16 respectively). This data is not sufficient to 
infer a rule similar to R1; i.e. we cannot use network adequacy 
alone in a single antecedent rule. However, our data does show 
that when the network adequacy level improves, participants 
begin paying attention to the other factors in the scenario and 
their decisions become based on the composition of these other 
factors. The regression model for the overall security rating 
shows that all the factors in the scenario are predictors of the 
model [12]. Hence, we decide to include more input variables in 
our rule set antecedents. Table II below shows the antecedents 
and consequent combinations for the remaining rules that we 
constructed from our scenarios. The column R# is the rule 
number, Antecedents are the requirements that serve as input 
antecedents in the if-then rules, Con. is the consequence output 
that is the rating of the overall security.  
From Table II, we can see how priority is given to the 
network, once it is adequate then other factors are considered. 
Only when all other factor levels are adequate, does the overall 
security rise to adequate. Our results show that certain factors 
have weaker ratings, and that strengthening the requirements 
without strengthening the network does not improve the overall 
security rating.  
Since our results did not show significant effects for 
excessive ratings, it becomes harder to infer rules for excessive 
cases. Regardless, we include the extreme case where all the 
security requirements are rated as excessive in order to raise the 
overall security to excessive. Combinations that are absent from 
the rules in the table, such as adequate/ excessive combinations, 
did not have any statistical significant results in the dataset. 
TABLE II.  RULES FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM  
R 
# 
Antecedents (IF) Con. (THEN) 
Network  SSL Password Timer  Overall 
R1 I    I 
R2 A I   I 
R3 A  I  I 
R4 A   I I 
R5 A A A A A 
R6 E E E E E 
 
V. QUALITATIVE SYSTEM EVALUATION 
In this section we explain our qualitative approach for 
system evaluation. Qualitative methods are better suited to our 
system evaluation as we are looking for the participants’ 
description of the process, the rationale, and their reasoning.  
A. Evaluation Process 
We evaluate our IT2FLS using a two stage process: first, we 
survey 13 experts and have each evaluate 4 scenarios each (52 
total test scenarios); and second, we conduct follow-up 
interviews to discuss participants’ decisions and their rationale.   
 The survey used in the first stage is similar to the survey in 
the original factorial vignettes study, which examined the 
interaction of a public/private network with SSL-encrypted 
connections, varying password strengths and an automatic, 
timed logout feature [12]. We modified the original design to 
limit the network levels to two levels that highly contrast each 
other: public unencrypted Wi-Fi and encrypted VPN. 
Furthermore, we use two levels for the password (weak/strong), 
and two levels for the logout timer (no timer, 15 min timer). We 
did not use a number of different SSL levels as this would 
present an obvious focal point for the participant to become 
concerned about security [12]. Hence, we reworded the scenario 
to describe SSL as follows: “The browser is already using the 
latest (and patched) version of SSL/TLS for the session.” 
Participants were randomly assigned to different conditions, and 
we randomized the order in which they see different vignettes. 
Each participant rates four vignettes in total with combinations 
that show the two levels of each variable: network, timer, and 
password.   
For each of the four scenarios, participants provide their 
overall security judgement of the scenario. Participants choose 
either: inadequate, adequate and excessive to evaluate the 
overall security adequacy without the use of any scales or 
numbers.  
The four inputs to the IT2FLS are the adequacy ratings for 
the network, the SSL, the password, and the timer. We use the 
participants’ provided ratings as inputs to our system.   The 
output would be the overall security rating represented by a 
number on an interval from 1-10. After we calculate the output, 
we interview participants and remind them of their initial ratings 
including the overall security judgement of the scenario. Before 
showing them the output of the system, we ask them to describe 
the overall security ratings on a scale from 1-10, and why they 
rated a scenario the way they did. Then, we show the participant 
the output of our security assessment system in the form of fuzzy 
sets and we solicit their opinion. Finally, we ask participants to 
state what they would change in the scenario to improve the 
adequacy ratings, and in contrast, what would they imagine to 
be the worst possible change to drop the adequacy ratings 
further.  
B. Evaluation Results 
The participants median score on the knowledge test was 7 
out of 10. Three out of 13 participants work in cybersecurity at 
federally-funded research and development centers, one 
participant has 10 years of experience as a security consultant, 
and the remaining 9 are graduate students from Carnegie Mellon 
University who completed security courses and who are 
involved in security research.  
 Table III shows the participant agreement for all eight 
scenario combinations: the network type, the password (Pwd), 
the logout timer (Timer), the total number of participants per 
scenario, and the percent agreement, which is the total number 
of overall ratings that match the ratings produced by the security 
assessment system. In Table III, we see participants disagreed 
with the system’s overall security rating predictions. We 
conducted follow-up interviews with nine participants. Six 
participants agreed with the security assessment system’s 
overall ratings for 4/4 scenarios: however, they explained that 
their assessment was borderline between two rating levels.  Two 
participants agreed with 3/4 scenarios in the system’s result: in 
the one disagreeable scenario, both participants provided an 
excessive rating while the system rated the scenario as adequate. 
Finally, the last participant P5, who scored 7 on the security 
knowledge test, disagreed with the system for 4/4 scenarios, 
because they mistakenly believed that SSL was an adequate 
mitigation against man-in-the-middle attack in all scenarios, 
even when the network is public Wi-Fi. The participant 
explains: “for the purpose of man-in-the-middle, SSL is all [that] 
we need; if we worry about sniffing while in a public place, then 
passwords and timers are important.” The participant 
acknowledged why the overall security could be inadequate: “If 
we are worried that users may not understand insecure 
certificates, then the VPN over an encrypted connection might 
provide an extra layer of security.” 
TABLE III.  PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT WITH OVERALL SECURITY 
 
Scenario  Total 
Participants   
Agreement 
Ratio Network (Wi-Fi) Pwd Timer 
Public unencrypted   Weak None 5 4/5 (80%) 
Public unencrypted   Weak 15-min 8 6/8 (75%) 
Public unencrypted   Strong None 8 6/8 (75%) 
Public unencrypted   Strong 15-min 5 3/5 (60%) 
VPN over encrypted Weak None 8 6/8 (75%) 
VPN over encrypted Weak 15-min 5 2/5 (40%) 
VPN over encrypted Strong None 5 2/5 (40%) 
VPN over encrypted Strong 15-min 8 4/8 (50%) 
 
The follow up interviews helped us verify the participants’ 
inputs, check for mistakes, and identify false positives. By false 
positives, we mean that participants could provide assessments 
that match the results of the system, but their reasons and 
priorities for security requirements did not match what the rule 
base had encoded. We found one false positive, participant P8, 
who scored 8 on the security knowledge test. Unlike P5 who 
disagreed with the system, P8 agreed but using a rationale 
similar to P5. Participant P8 mistakenly believed that SSL made 
the other factors less relevant, because they believe that SSL 
alone is sufficient to defeat man-in-the-middle attacks. The 
participant did not rate SSL as adequate, because they were 
concerned about checking the certificates and about whether or 
not users would trust untrusted certificates. 
We asked participants: “what is the most important change 
in the scenario that, if it occurs, will cause you to drop your 
ratings?” All eight participants identified SSL, which only had 
one level; participants did not see stronger or weaker SSL 
variants, despite the existence of such variants. Participants 
identified requirements when weaker settings were presented: 
e.g., if they saw no timer, they would suggest adding a timer. 
This behavior was expected, because participants saw 
combinations where they reviewed both weak and strong 
settings for network, timer, and password.  
We asked participants to identify requirements changes that 
would cause them to improve their adequacy ratings. Participant 
P8 indicated they would improve SSL by ensuring the server 
certificates are checked. The remaining six participants all 
suggested avoiding public unencrypted Wi-Fi and replacing it 
with a VPN over encrypted Wi-Fi or even better, as two 
participants suggested, using their own private home network. 
The six participants also suggested using a timer for automatic 
logout instead of no-timer, and using a stronger password setting 
instead of a plain 8-character password with no enforced 
character requirements. One participant suggested adding two-
factor authentication to the scenario. 
Our survey results reveal when participants provide different 
ratings to the same requirement level in two different scenarios.  
Eight of 13 participants provided different network ratings for 
the same network, but in two different scenarios. Four of eight 
participants clarified their choice during a follow-up interview. 
Three of four participants reported not remembering their 
previous choice, which suggests within-subject’s variance. The 
remaining participant reported providing different network 
ratings, because they believe that their decisions were impacted 
by other requirements settings, such as the timer and password.  
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY   
When reporting results from surveys and experiments, it is 
important to address threats to validity that arise from the study 
design, study execution and interpretation of results [26]. The 
threats to validity for the previously collected vignette study data 
are reported, previously [12]. We now review the threats for the 
new studies reported in this paper. 
 Construct validity concerns how well the measurements we 
take correspond to the construct of interest [26]. As shown in 
Section III, we conducted a series of studies to evaluate our ad 
hoc scales, including the word rank study and word interval 
study to determine the adequacy label intervals.  To ensure that 
participants have a shared understanding of the ratings, we 
provided one-sentence definitions for each rating level. For the 
experience indicator variable ($Score), we are the first to 
introduce such a test, thus we need further evaluation to assess 
the level of expertise indicated by this score. 
 Internal validity is the degree to which a causal relationship 
can be inferred between the independent predictor variables and 
the outcome dependent variables [26]. In the word interval study 
to collect the start and end points for the word labels, we 
randomize the order of words shown to each participant. In the 
evaluation survey, we randomized the assignment to different 
scenarios, and of the order of the vignettes shown to each 
participant to reduce the effects of framing due to scenario order. 
We randomized the order of the three adequacy ratings in the 
overall security-rating question, and we mask the numerical 
values for these ratings from participants. To address the threats 
of learning and fatigue effects, we limited surveys to a 20-
minute, average time estimate for completion.  
External validity concerns how well our results generalize to 
the population and situations outside the sample used in the 
study [26]. Our target population is security analysts with 
varying expertise. We recruited participants using security 
mailing lists, while specifically recruiting security experts from 
a research lab specializing in security. Furthermore, we 
conducted a security knowledge test to measure the extent of 
security expertise. Sample bias can arise because our participant 
sample was drawn from only two U.S. institutions, and because 
our scenarios are limited to only a few factors. 
VII. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We now discuss our results in the presence of inter- and 
intra-expert uncertainty among analysts’ security decisions, and 
we explain the reliability of our security assessment system.  
Inter-expert uncertainty is the uncertainty that exists between 
multiple analysts [16]. Security analysts, in particular, 
demonstrate this uncertainty by disagreeing on the same 
scenario [12] or artifact [13].  Our method does not rely on a 
single analyst’s assessment: if the analyst experiences 
uncertainty, then other analysts’ judgments would reduce the 
uncertainty, unless all analysts are uncertain. As shown in 
Section V, the two participants P5 and P8 stated that a good 
SSL/TLS protocol is sufficient to defeat a man-in-the-middle 
attack, even if the network is public Wi-Fi. While these analysts 
believe that SSL/TLS is sufficient, others argue that this is 
insufficient over public Wi-Fi and they recommend using a 
secure VPN. This is an example of inter-expert uncertainty. To 
illustrate, if a user is connected over public Wi-Fi, and they are 
visiting a non-SSL website before being redirected to an SSL-
enabled website, then it is easy for a malicious adversary to 
hijack the session and redirect the user to a website with a forged 
certificate. Furthermore, the attacker can use certificates signed 
with trusted certificates, which can cause the SSL connection to 
appear safe in the browser [10, 14]. Rare events and recent 
advances in technology illustrate the need for decision-support 
tools that address limitations of human perception and memory, 
such as the over- or under-estimation of risk. Cognitive 
psychologists argue that human memory can fail to recall 
relevant facts, which can be used to inform decision support 
models, theories and frameworks to yield intelligent systems [5]. 
Even the “best” expert can make mistakes and needs support 
with their evaluation. 
Intra-expert uncertainty is the uncertainty that one analyst 
exhibits in their own judgment [16]. In follow-up interviews, we 
observed how three experts provided different ratings of the 
same factors, highlighting variation in opinion over time, e.g., 
because of new information or a change in context. Other factors 
that affect intra-expert uncertainty include how representative a 
scenario appears, or how available the analyst’s knowledge of 
recent events are when passing judgment [28]. In a prior study 
[12], the SSL Heartbleed vulnerability that affects OpenSSL had 
recently been announced and this event affected participants’ 
responses about adequacy ratings for SSL [12]. Thus, surveys to 
collect adequacy ratings may need to be repeated to react to the 
evolving influences of certain events. 
We choose IT2 FSs to build our assessment system because 
they have the capacity to individually model inter- and intra-
expert uncertainties. As shown in our results, we interviewed 
nine participants in order to verify 36 test scenarios. In only six 
scenarios (19%), participants disagreed with the security 
assessment system. In all these six test cases, the security 
assessment system was more conservative compared to the 
participants’ ratings, i.e., the system indicates inadequate when 
the participant reports adequate, or the system indicates 
adequate for a situation that the participant reports as excessive. 
Participant P9 commented, “in security, I prefer a conservative 
system’s rating like that.” 
Rule reduction improves readability by human analysts. In 
Section IV, we show how the rule base is derived from expert-
ratings in factorial vignette surveys and we present heuristics to 
omit unnecessary inputs in the rule antecedents. However, this 
method has a limitation in that it does not model situations that 
are absent from the dataset. For example, in the scenarios that 
we studied, we cannot model requirements combinations that are 
excessive or adequate overall, because these were not present in 
survey data. However, this limitation can be addressed by 
improving the survey design using expert focus groups aimed at 
discovering scenarios wherein security is deemed excessive. 
Fuzzy logic has been applied in multiple domains [19], 
including security [7, 15, 25]. Fuzzy data mining techniques 
using Type-1 Fuzzy Logic have been introduced in intrusion 
detection systems and have shown an improved outcome [7, 15, 
25]. De Ru and Eloff proposed modelling risk analysis using 
Type-1 Fuzzy Logic and explain that modelling risk analysis 
with fuzzy logic produces system recommendations that are 
very close to real situations. They argue that without such 
systems, organizations run the risk of over- or under-estimating 
security risks [24]. In this work, we have shown how sometimes 
analysts underestimate the risk when our assessment system 
provides more conservative ratings in 19% of the test scenarios. 
De Ru and Eloff’s Type-1 Fuzzy Logic system was not based on 
security knowledge elicited from multiple experts. 
 In this paper, we introduced a new approach to build an 
automated security assessment system based on IT2FLSs. We 
use survey data collected from 174 security experts to derive the 
IT2FL rules, and we built membership functions based on this 
data. Finally, we evaluated the system by running 52 test 
scenarios on 13 participants. Results indicate that the system 
succeeds in providing a reliable assessment to analysts, 
although, it was more conservative in 19% of the 52 scenarios 
by assessing the security to be lower than our human evaluators. 
In future work, we plan to construct scenarios for richer 
environments based on multi-step attack vectors. In addition, we 
aim to study ways to recommend to security analysts which 
requirements will achieve higher overall security ratings. We 
also plan to complement expert ratings with real-world 
vulnerability data to assess variability across experts. Finally, we 
are interested in studying ways to compute the adequacy ratings 
from requirements class members to help novice analysts learn 
which security mitigations specifically increase or decrease 
overall system security based on expert judgments.   
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